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GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL: THE
ETHICAL DILEMMA OF MENTAL
ILLNESS AS A TOOL OF THE
PROSECUTION
LAUREN G. JOHANSEN*
ABSTRACT
While other jurisdictions use guilty but mentally ill as a compromise verdict
to fill the gap between guilty by reason of insanity and a guilty verdict after
an unsuccessful insanity defense, Alaska has transformed the status into a
prosecutorial tool to keep mentally ill defendants incarcerated for longer than
their mentally sane counterparts through denial of “good time” credit.
Although Blakely was used—correctly—to prevent the denial of the mentally
ill their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in December 2013’s State v. Clifton, the court of appeals
eliminated any utility from this middle ground, rendering serious mental
illness short of M’Naghten insanity a per se aggravating circumstance.

INTRODUCTION
This Article will discuss the current state of the guilty but mentally
ill (GBMI) verdict in Alaska, the 2012 “Blakely fix,” and the Alaska Court
of Appeals’ decision in State v. Clifton. This Article will argue that
prosecution-initiated GBMI is unethical and if not repealed will be
increasingly used, post-Clifton, by prosecutors to deny mentally ill
defendants their entitlement to good-time credit and will further disincentivize defense investigation and defense presentation of a
defendant’s mental illness.
Part I will provide the reader with an overview of the affirmative
defense of insanity, the use of evidence of diminished capacity to
undercut proof of intent, guilty but mentally ill, and civil commitment.
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Part II will discuss the legal developments that provide a backdrop to
Ms. Clifton’s appeal, including a discussion of the Apprendi line of
United States Supreme Court decisions and Forster in Alaska. Part III
will discuss Clifton and the post-2012 version of section 12.47.030 of the
Alaska Statutes. Part IV will highlight the GBMI verdict as a tool of the
prosecution with special emphasis on evidentiary and ethical
considerations.

I.

INSANITY AND RELATED ADJUDICATIONS IN ALASKA, A
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL OVERVIEW

This Part seeks to introduce the social, legal, and medical history of
the insanity defense and related alternative dispositions in Alaska as
well as to highlight key movements in Alaska’s political and social
landscape related to the mentally ill criminal defendant.
The law has long recognized that a person who suffers from a
serious mental illness is “not to be regarded as a moral agent, or
punishable by the law for his acts.”1 Insanity is, at its core, a legal fiction
created to enhance the predictive value of what is otherwise an
imprecise or complicated medical standard.2 This Article will not
discuss the various insanity defense standards that other jurisdictions
use.3
A slim majority of United States jurisdictions use the M’Naghten
test to determine whether a criminal defendant qualifies for an insanity
acquittal.4 The M’Naghten test arose from public backlash following an
1843 assassination attempt on British Prime Minister Robert Peel.5
Daniel M’Naghten was acquitted of murder for fatally shooting one of
P.M. Peel’s secretaries.6 Following the judgment of acquittal on the basis
of Mr. M’Naghten’s insanity, a panel of judges was asked a series of
hypothetical questions about the common law insanity defense as it
existed at that time.7 The answers to these questions resulted in the
M’Naghten test of legal insanity.8 Under M’Naghten, an accused may not
be held criminally responsible if at the time of the criminal conduct she

1. Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600, 613 (Miss. Err. & App. 1856).
2. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(a) (5th ed. 2010) (describing the
American Law Institute’s insanity test).
3. For further reading, see Insanity Defense, 41 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 615
(2014); see also Andrew March, Note, Insanity in Alaska, 98 GEO. L.J. 1481 (2010).
4. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2, 7.2(a) (2d ed. 2003).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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was suffering from a mental disease or defect which rendered them
unknowing of either, (a) the nature and quality of the act, or (b) that the
act was wrong.9
Alaska currently uses only the first prong of the M’Naghten test: a
defendant is to be found not guilty if at the time of the offense she was
“unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the
nature and quality of her conduct.”10 M’Naghten has been widely
criticized in the United States since the 1960’s as inapplicable to mental
illnesses that result in unlawful actions committed during, and in
obedience to, prolonged and sustained hallucinatory directives.11 For
example, a person who experiences auditory hallucinations that direct
her to kill her children to save them from “Evil” may be able to resist
such a thought for a time, but eventually, over a period of years, may
come to believe that it is, indeed, necessary to kill her children in order
to save them. This person is excluded from a not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI) defense in Alaska because she knows that she is killing a
person, but she cannot resist the directives of her hallucinations.
Defense counsel must provide written notice to the court of their
intent to rely on the NGI defense within ten days of entering a plea or at
another pre-trial juncture if there is good cause for later notice.12 Insanity
is a complete affirmative defense and negates all criminal culpability for
the alleged crime.13 However, as Subsection A of this Part, infra, shall
discuss, the successful insanity defendant will very likely be civilly
committed for a long, indefinite period following an NGI acquittal,
which partially explains the rarity of insanity pleas except in extremely
serious felonies akin to aggravated murder.
Alaska has both an NGI verdict, which negates culpability, and an
alternate GBMI verdict, after which the defendant will be exposed to the
same potential punishment as a sane offender.14 The punishment for a
GBMI defendant will be the same as a similarly situated “sane” person
except that the Alaska Department of Corrections (DoC) is required to
provide mental health treatment during incarceration and the defendant
is not entitled to parole or furlough during continuing treatment with
the DoC.15

9. Id.
10. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (2013). See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d
944, 949 (Alaska 1987) (holding that Alaska’s Insanity statutes only incorporate
the first M’Naghten prong, and not the second).
11. Insanity Defense, supra note 3, at 615.
12. § 12.47.010(b).
13. § 12.47.010(d).
14. § 12.47.050.
15. § 12.47.030; § 12.47.050.
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In Alaska, the GBMI verdict has a different, and more broadly
applicable, standard for determining mental illness at the time of the
offense than NGI’s M’Naghten standard. For a defendant to be found
GBMI, the prosecution or defense must show that, at the time the
conduct occurred, the defendant lacked as a result of a mental disease or
defect the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
their conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.16
This is a formulation of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code
definition of legal insanity (ALI).17
The ALI test is broader than M’Naghten, using the term “substantial
capacity” to describe the mentally ill person’s volitional ability. The
drafters of the ALI test noted that the “substantial capacity” part of the
test accommodates an outsider’s inability to identify a defendant’s
degree of impairment precisely.18 “Inability to conform conduct to the
law” solves the deficiency of my previous example, wherein a person is
ground down over a period of years by auditory hallucinations or other
mental health symptoms to commit a crime they believe is necessary as
a result of their disordered thought process.19 Also, the ALI test
substitutes M’Naghten’s “know” with the ALI’s “appreciate.”20 The
“appreciate” standard allows an expert witness to enter the defendant’s
realm of past experiences more easily and also to discuss the affect on
emotional states of being and the effect on the defendant therein at the
time of the offense.21 To prevent jurisdictions that may adopt this
standard from exonerating those persons with nondelusional mental
disorders—such as psychopathy or personality disorders, which are not
chemically-treatable mental illnesses but involve diminished empathy,
remorse, and self-control—the ALI added a definitional, exclusive,
second paragraph to the test, which reads: “As used in this Article, the
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct.”22 Alaska includes this language in its GBMI statute,23 but one
can also find this language in section 12.47.010(c) of the Alaska
Statutes.24
Alaska also allows the defense to present evidence of diminished

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

§ 12.47.030.
See LAFAVE, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(b) (2013).
Id.
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capacity.25 The diminished capacity doctrine allows the defendant to
introduce evidence that creates a reasonable doubt as to whether she
formed the requisite mens rea for the crime charged as a result of a
mental disease or defect. The state has the burden of proving every
element of the charged crime, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable
doubt.26 Evidence of diminished capacity is not an affirmative defense,
but rather a failure-of-proof defense.27 The defendant may still be
convicted of lesser-included offenses with lesser or no mens rea
elements (e.g., negligence or strict-liability crimes).28 Alaska requires
timely notice to the court that the defense will rely on evidence of
diminished capacity.29 Successful use of the diminished capacity defense
(either as a complete defense or lesser-included conviction) can only
result in a verdict of NGI to the charged offense,30 in contrast to a verdict
of not guilty. The successful diminished capacity defendant is still
subject to automatic civil commitment, as discussed in Subsection A of
this Part.
Following the entry of an NGI verdict, a defendant will be
involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment facility.31 We now
turn to a discussion of involuntary civil commitment to illustrate the
rarity of the NGI defense due to the resulting loss of liberty.
A.

Involuntary Civil Commitment

When John Hinkley was found not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGI) following his attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan, the
public outcry was deafening. Multiple jurisdictions re-wrote statutory
insanity defenses that had been carefully crafted over years using the
emerging bio-medical understanding of mental illnesses.32 But even
before John Hinkley’s Jodie Foster-fueled assassination attempt, Alaska
had already been especially zealous as a result of the infamous Robert
Meach murders.33 A discussion of civil commitment, usually of

25. § 12.47.020(a).
26. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
27. Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 564 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). Diminished
capacity is not an element of the prosecution’s case-in-chief that must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 571.
28. § 12.47.020.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. § 12.47.090(b).
32. Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinkley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18tue4 .html
(last visited March 31, 2015).
33. Robert Meach presented a successful MPC insanity defense to murder in
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extensive duration, following a defendant’s successful insanity defense,
was absent from the public discourse during statutory overhaul in many
jurisdictions including Alaska.34
Outside of the context of an NGI verdict, civil commitment (or
parens patriae commitment) is generally authorized when a person is
found to be (a) under the influence of a mental illness, and (b) as a result
of her mental illness, a danger to herself or others.35 Both prongs (mental
illness and dangerousness) must be satisfied to comport with due
process.36 A mental illness for purposes of civil commitment in Alaska is
defined by statute:
[A]n organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has
substantive adverse effects on an individual’s ability to exercise
conscious control of the individual’s actions or ability to
perceive reality or to reason or understand; intellectual
disability, developmental disability, or both, epilepsy, drug
addiction, and alcoholism do not per se constitute mental
illness, although persons suffering from these conditions may
also be suffering from mental illness.37
In a commitment hearing for a person who is alleged to be a danger

1973. Then, on May 3, 1981, while out on a day pass from the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute (API), he killed four teenagers. This crime spurred the Alaska State
Legislature to repeal the ten-year-old MPC insanity defense, and institute the
restrictive statutory language that incorporates only the first M’Naghten prong
and GBMI. Wallace Turner, New Law on Insanity Plea Stirs Dispute in Alaska, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1982, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/
us/new-law-on-insanity-plea-stirs-dispute-in-alaska.html (last visited March 31,
2015).
34. John Hinkley has spent almost thirty-two years in civil confinement at
St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in D.C. He has only recently been allowed to go on
seventeen-day unsupervised trips to stay with family in Williamsburg, VA.
These trips are transitional to permanent release and began in December 2013,
following a U.S. District Court ruling for his release. Hospital officials claimed
his mental illness has been in remission for several years. Ronald Regan Shooter
Free, ‘Released and Unsupervised’, INT’L BUS. TIMES AUSTL., March 7, 2014,
available at http://au.ibtimes.com/ronald-reagan-shooter-john-hinckley-freereleased-unsupervised-photo-1334176 (last visited March 31, 2015); Matt
Zapotosky, Federal judge grants more freedom to John Hinkley Jr., Reagan’s would-be
assassin, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2013, available at http:// www.washingtonpost
.com/local/crime/federal-judge-grants-more-freedom-to-reagans-would-beassassin/2013/12/20/efdd2c60-68e9-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html (last
visited March 31, 2015).
35. § 47.30.730(a)(1). See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (noting that involuntary confinement is generally justified by preventing
harm to the individual and others).
36. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that the state
must prove these two elements by at least clear and convincing evidence).
37. § 47.30.915(14).
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to themselves or others, the state need not allege that treatment will
improve the mentally ill person’s condition.38 Rather, the purpose of
commitment is to protect either the public or the mentally ill person,
who may harm herself through some volitional act.39
The state can also seek to commit those persons who are gravely
disabled by their mental illness. The gravely disabled option allows the
state to commit those persons who cannot, as a result of a mental illness,
“live safely in freedom”40 and who “risk[] harm from passive failure to
secure their own basic needs.”41 Under this portion of the statute, the
state must allege that treatment will improve the gravely disabled
person’s condition. Even if the person is so disabled they cannot care for
themselves, they still retain important liberty considerations protected in
the absence of volitional self-harm or harm to others.42
The time periods in which a person may be involuntarily civilly
committed are finite and increase in duration. Typically, a person will
enter the civil commitment track when local police or family member
take her to a treatment facility following an incident where the peace
officer has probable cause to believe that the person is mentally ill and
may be a harm to herself or others and/or gravely disabled.43 A mental
health professional must evaluate the person within twenty-four hours
after her arrival at the treatment facility.44 If the evaluator believes the
person has a mental illness that causes a likelihood of future harm to
herself or others, or that the person is gravely disabled as a result of
mental illness, the mental health professional may detain that person on
an emergency basis and apply for an ex parte order.45 Once a judge
grants the ex parte order for evaluation, the facility has seventy-two
hours to evaluate the person for evidence of a mental illness. Before that
period expires, a judge will make a determination of probable cause for

38. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Alaska 2009) (“We
conclude that the state is not required to show a likelihood that, in the case of a
mentally ill person who poses a danger to himself, treatment will improve his
condition.”).
39. Id. at 1110.
40. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 377 (Alaska 2007)
(citing O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 n.9). See also § 47.30.915(9)(B) (defining “gravely
disabled,” in part, as a condition associated with the deterioration of a person’s
ability to function independently).
41. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1110.
42. See id. (distinguishing between the gravely disabled, who risk harm
from passive failure to secure basic needs, and those who are likely to harm
themselves or others, who risk harm by acting affirmatively).
43. Id.
44. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.710 (2013).
45. Id. The mentally ill person is also appointed counsel for the thirty-day
commitment period hearing. Id.
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commitment for thirty days, then for a period of ninety days, and finally
for a period of 180 days, which will subsequently repeat on 180-day
intervals until the person can live safely in freedom.46
B.

Committing NGI Acquittees

A defendant who is acquitted via a not guilty by reason of insanity
verdict is almost always committed to a mental health treatment facility.
The NGI acquittee is entitled to a hearing before the trier of fact at the
same trial as to whether the defendant presently poses a danger to
themselves or others as a result of a mental illness.47 At this hearing, the
defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that she no
longer suffers from “any mental illness that causes the defendant to be
dangerous to the public” to avoid automatic civil commitment.48 If the
defendant fails to meet this burden, the court shall order the defendant
committed.49
The state has the power to commit NGI acquittees for periods
longer than the statutory maximum sentence following Jones v. United
States.50 In this case, Mr. Jones, a paranoid schizophrenic, was acquitted
NGI for petit larceny, a misdemeanor crime.51 Mr. Jones was held
involuntarily at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in D.C. for over one year (thus,
placing him beyond the maximum period of incarceration for a
misdemeanor).52 Mr. Jones argued that an NGI acquittal did not
constitute a finding of present mental illness and dangerousness as
Addington v. Texas required, and that a past criminal conviction had little
to no predictive value of future dangerousness.53 The court disagreed:
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness. Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may
be at least as persuasive as any predictions about
dangerousness that might be made in a civil commitment
proceeding. We do not agree . . . that the requisite
dangerousness is not established by proof that a person
committed a non-violent crime against property.54

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

§§ 47.30.715–755.
§ 12.47.090.
§§ 12.47.090(a)–(c).
§ 12.47.090(c).
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 364–65.
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Jones also requires periodic review hearings to comport with due
process,55 and requires the release of NGI acquittees no longer suffering
from mental illness.56 Despite the overlap between NGI, civil
commitment, incarceration, and indefinite commitment of NGI
acquittees, civil commitment of NGI acquittees does not violate the
prohibition on double jeopardy.57
An extended NGI commitment is reviewed annually by the
committing court, and is subject to the standards previously discussed
for a thirty-day involuntary civil commitment.58 Evidence of the
underlying crime, in conjunction with evidence of the defendant’s
inability to appreciate her actions, will be compelling evidence of danger
to the community in an annual commitment hearing. Evidence of the
risk of danger extends the commitment indefinitely, depending on the
severity of the mental illness. The DoC can petition for civil commitment
of GBMI defendants at the conclusion of their sentence if they continue
to receive treatment and the DoC has good cause to believe the person is
still mentally ill and poses a threat to themselves or public safety.59
A commitment’s temporal uncertainty for the mentally ill
defendant partially explains defense counsel’s reluctance to recommend
their clients pursue an insanity defense, present evidence of diminished
capacity, or seek a GBMI verdict. Troublingly, these verdicts expose a
mentally ill defendant to a longer period of incarceration than a
similarly situated “sane” person.

II. THE PLAGUE: PRE-2012 GBMI IN ALASKA
Alaska revised its insanity defense statute to include only the first
prong of the M’Naghten test following the outcry over Robert Meach’s
second murder. To be found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), a
defendant must show that at the time of the offense he was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct as a result of a mental
disease or defect.60 Practically, this first prong will only apply to a
defendant who, when firing a gun at another person, did not

55. Id. at 368. However, the state has no burden of showing the two prongs
of civil commitment—continuing mental illness and dangerousness—under the
automatic commitment model. Id.
56. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992). The NGI acquittee with no
remaining treatable mental illness must be released. Therefore, an NGI acquittee,
like Foucha, cannot be held on the basis of a remaining personality disorder. Id.
57. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735 (2013).
59. § 12.47.050(e).
60. § 12.47.010.
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understand that the bullet could potentially kill that person. The
M’Naghten test in NGI would not apply to the person who believes that
shooting a person is not illegal or is not morally wrong as a result of
their mental illness. Given the extremely limited availability of an
insanity defense in Alaska following this statutory revision, the
legislature adopted an alternative verdict: guilty but mentally ill
(GBMI).61 In the NGI scenario, after the defense presents an insanity
defense, the jury will also be instructed that if they do not find an NGI
verdict, they must consider a possible GBMI verdict.62 Then, if the
prosecution has proven all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt and the defense has not successfully presented an insanity
defense, the jury must reject an NGI verdict and consider a verdict of
GBMI.63 To find the defendant GBMI in the NGI/GBMI context, the jury
applies the ALI test of insanity.64
Before the 2012 Blakely fix of Alaska’s GBMI statutes, a trial judge
determined GBMI based on a preponderance of the evidence standard in
a post-conviction hearing.65 A post-conviction GBMI hearing could be
requested by the defense, prosecution, or on the court’s own motion.66
During the GBMI hearing, the court would determine whether the
defendant met the ALI definition of insanity as previously described in
Part I, supra.67 The ALI test of insanity is less stringent than the
M’Naghten NGI analysis. If the defendant was found GBMI under the
ALI test, the court would enter a verdict of GBMI and thereby the DoC
would deny any good time credit or furlough for the duration of the
incarcerated person’s treatment.68 Pre-2012, there was no DoC policy to
allow the defendant to review the necessity of continued treatment
following a GBMI finding.69 No such provision exists today.70
Following entry of a GMBI verdict the court will sentence the

61. § 12.47.040.
62. Id.
63. § 12.47.040(c).
64. § 12.47.050.
65. § 12.47.060, amended by §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70.
66. Id.
67. § 12.47.030.
68. See § 12.47.050 (“[A] defendant receiving treatment under . . . this section
may not be released . . . on furlough . . . or . . . on parole.”).
69. Crimes Against Children, S. 210, 27th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2012),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=002
50&end_line=00804&session=27&comm=JUD&date=20120210&time=1333.
70. The Department of Corrections does provide for review of the
defendant’s continuing mental illness under § 12.47.050(e), but this review is
only pursuant to determining whether the commissioner is required to file a
petition for involuntary civil commitment under § 47.30.070, and occurs thirty
days before the end of the defendant’s sentence.
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defendant the same way as a similarly situated sane person and the DoC
will provide mental health treatment to the defendant for a length of
time depending on the severity of her mental illness.71 As long as the
mentally ill defendant is in treatment during her sentence, she is neither
eligible for release on furlough (except for treatment in a “secure
facility”) nor eligible for parole.72 The computation for awarding credit
for “good time,” set forth by statute,73 is not available for the GBMI
defendant who is still in treatment with the DOC.74
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,75
which held that due process and the Sixth Amendment required any fact
(other than a prior conviction) that increases punishment beyond a
statutory maximum sentence be submitted and proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.76 The Court went on in a 2004 decision, Blakely v.
Washington,77 to hold that the Sixth Amendment required a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that would increase a mandatory
guideline sentence within a statutory sentencing range (not merely the
maximum sentence allowed by law).78
Alaska applied the Apprendi and Blakely holdings to section
33.020.010 of the Alaska Statutes’ good time computation in a 2010 court
of appeals decision, Forster v. State.79 At trial, Mr. Forster was convicted
of first-degree murder for killing Kenai Police Officer John Watson.80
Typically, a first-degree murder conviction has a sentencing range of 2099 years to serve.81 However, a 99-year mandatory sentence without the
possibility of parole applies if the defendant is convicted of first-degree
murder of “a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer . . .
who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the
murder.”82 Although there was no dispute that Officer Watson was
uniformed and engaging in official duties at the time of his death, the
jury did not make that finding at trial.83 Following Blakely, the superior

71. § 12.47.050(b).
72. § 12.47.050.
73. See § 33.20.010(a) (“[Defendants are] entitled to a deduction of one-third
of the term of imprisonment rounded off to the nearest day if the prisoner
follows the rules of the correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined.”).
74. § 12.47.050.
75. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
76. Id. at 490.
77. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
78. Id. at 303–04.
79. 236 P.3d 1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
80. Id. at 1160.
81. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013).
82. § 12.55.125(a)(1).
83. Forster, 236 P.3d at 1169.
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court declined to impose the mandatory 99-year sentence without parole
because the jury did not make a required finding of fact.84 The superior
court entered the maximum sentence of ninety-nine years.85 The court of
appeals then determined whether “a defendant is entitled to have a jury
find the facts that result in [an] elimination of the good-time deduction”
by restricting the defendant’s right to parole.86 The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court and held that “a sentencing court may not
restrict or eliminate a defendant’s good-time credit and mandatory
parole without holding a jury trial on the aggravating circumstance.”87
This decision brought the denial of good-time credit under the auspices
of Blakely in Alaska.
In 2009, while presiding over State v. Clifton,88 Judge Volland of the
Alaska Superior Court in Anchorage saw that the GBMI statute, as
written, violated Blakely by denying GBMI defendants good-time credit
on facts not determined by a jury.89 Around that same time, the State of
Alaska went about crafting a “Blakely Fix” of the GBMI statutes to
require a jury finding of GBMI.90
However, a finding of GBMI by jury was not enough to cure the
defense community’s unease regarding defense-initiated presentation of
mental illness. During a presentation before the House Judiciary on
GBMI in 2012, the Deputy Director for the Public Defender Agency,
Criminal Division, stated that:
GBMI provisions currently doesn’t [sic] effect a great many
clients, because defense counsel will do everything possible to
avoid a GBMI verdict because it results in greater punishment
for the client because they don’t get parole, they’re not eligible

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1170.
87. Id. at 1172. However, the court also found that the superior court was
required to impose the restriction on discretionary parole that is mandated in §
12.55.125(a)—the offense for which the defendant was convicted at trial. This is
because in a previous Alaska Supreme Court case—State v. Malloy—the court
held that a sentencing court has the statutory authority to impose a 99-year
sentence with no eligibility for parole even without the finding of an
aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder sentencing. See id. at 1170
(discussing State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949, 954 (Alaska 2002)).
88. 315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
89. Id. at 702–03.
90. Act of July 1, 2012, §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70; see also Hearing
on S. 210 Before the H. Finance Comm., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg.,
2nd Sess. (April 13, 2012) (statement of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Att’y Gen. of
the Alaska Department of Law), available at http://www.legis.
state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&9beg_line=01083&end_line=014
65&session=27&comm=FIN&date=20120413&time=0912.
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for early release to a halfway house, or anything like that. So,
we try and avoid it like the plague.91

III. CITO, LONGE, TARDE: POST-2012 GBMI IN ALASKA AND
STATE V. CLIFTON
A.

2012 GBMI Amendments

In response to the Blakely decision, the Alaska Legislature amended
section 12.47.060 of the Alaska Statutes to require that guilty but
mentally ill (GBMI), if raised by the prosecution, must be proven to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless waived by the defense.92 The bill
was originally introduced as SB 186, sponsored by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and was intended to reconcile Alaska GBMI to the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in Blakely and Apprendi.93
The statutory changes would apply “to [all] proceedings occurring
on or after the effective date of this Act.”94 These changes apply
regardless of whether the defendant committed an offense “before, on or
after the effective date of this Act.”95 Therefore, the GBMI statutory
revisions retroactively applied to Ms. Clifton’s 2006 offense and the 2009
superior court trial.
Meanwhile, the State had already appealed the superior court’s
decision in State v. Clifton. We now turn to a detailed look at Ms.
Clifton’s trial and the result of the State’s appeal.
B.

State v. Clifton: The Superior Court Case
On August 2, 2006, Ms. Clifton pressed a loaded handgun into her

91. Statement of Douglas Moody, Hearing on S. 186 Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM, Minutes, 27th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 10, 2012)
(statement of Douglas Moody, Deputy Director for the Public Defender Agency,
Criminal Division), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_
minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00250&end_line=00804&session=27&comm=JUD&
date=20120210&time=1333.
92. Act of July 1, 2012, §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70; see also Hearing
on S. 210 Before the H. Finance Comm., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg.,
2nd Sess. (April 13, 2012) (statement of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Att’y Gen. of
the
Alaska
Department
of
Law),
available
at
http://www.
legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&9beg_line=01083&end_lin
e=01465&session=27&comm=FIN&date=20120413&time=0912.
93. Hearing on S. 186 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 90.
94. Crimes/Sentencing/Parole/Victims, § 17, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70,
7, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid=
SB0210Z&session=27.
95. Id.
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supervisor’s ribcage. Ms. Clifton believed the government conspired to
ruin her life and harm her physically.96 She claimed she had been raped
in Saudi Arabia by a high-ranking military officer who now lives in
Anchorage.97 Ms. Clifton told co-workers about the government
conspiracy against her, prompting her supervisor, Steven Mayer, to
decide she needed to undergo a psychiatric evaluation before returning
to work.98 During a meeting on this issue, Ms. Clifton became agitated,
pushed a loaded gun into Mr. Mayer’s ribs, and pulled the trigger.99 Ms.
Clifton used a semi-automatic handgun that required the user to “rack”
the top slide; she failed to do this. No round entered the chamber and no
bullet fired.100 Officers responding to the incident found five rounds
inside the gun, a loaded magazine in her purse, and six loose rounds of
ammunition in her bag.101 Ms. Clifton was indicted on one count of
attempted first-degree murder and one count of third-degree assault for
placing her supervisor in fear of serious physical injury.102
Ms. Clifton sent Judge Volland a handwritten pro se letter from jail
in May 2007 reiterating her belief in a government conspiracy against
her.103 In this letter she complained of her treatment in prison and of her
appointed counsel.104 Ms. Clifton’s counsel requested a competency
evaluation.105 Ms. Clifton was sent to API for evaluation by Dr. Lois
Michauld, and based on Dr. Michauld’s findings, Ms. Clifton was found
not competent to stand trial.106 Following the State’s request for an
additional evaluation from an alternate individual, Dr. David Sperbeck
evaluated Ms. Clifton, and like Dr. Michauld, he concluded that Ms.
Clifton was not competent to stand trial and that she suffered from a
“Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type.”107 Ms. Clifton was committed
to API in August of 2008 for restoration of competency.108 Ms. Clifton
had three intervening competency evaluations and subsequent hearings
in October, November, and December of 2008 before she was found

96. Brief for Petitioner at 3, State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App.
2013) (No. A-10941).
97. Id.
98. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 698.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at 7.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

ARTICLE 1 - JOHANSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

5/18/2015 2:01 PM

15

competent to stand trial in January 2009 and a trial date was set.109
The State filed Motion to Preclude Argument/Evidence of Insanity
or Diminished Capacity at Trial on July 13, 2009, and indicated it would
seek a GBMI finding following a guilty verdict using the pre-2012 GBMI
statutes.110 The State changed this position in September and gave notice
that if Ms. Clifton took the stand the State would seek a GBMI jury
instruction, as well as call either of the competency evaluators to testify
as to Ms. Clifton’s mental health.111 The defense objected to the use of
competency evaluators as expert witnesses to Ms. Clifton’s mental
illness at the time of the offense and the superior court ordered Ms.
Clifton to submit to a psychiatric evaluation for a possible State-initiated
GBMI finding.112 Ms. Clifton exercised her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and refused to submit to a psychiatric
evaluation.113
Ms. Clifton’s trial occurred in late October 2009, during which her
supervisors and responding officers only hinted at her mental illness
and defense counsel presented no evidence of her mental illness. The
state did not seek a jury instruction on GBMI. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty of attempted murder and assault in the third degree on
November 4, 2009. Following trial the prosecutor moved the court to
find Ms. Clifton GBMI.114 The defense objected to the constitutionality of
the post-trial GBMI on the following three grounds:

109. Id.
110. Id at 9.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 13. These actions on behalf of the state begin to reveal the pressure
placed on Ms. Clifton to bring her mental illness into the trial. The state, in its
petition for review argued “that without a proper instruction on the possibility
of a GBMI determination. . . [Ms.] Clifton might get the windfall of an
undeserved outright acquittal if jurors concluded that she was mentally ill but
did not know how to factor that into the traditional guilty/not guilty choice.” Id.
at 11. To which defense counsel “essentially confirmed that he was gambling on
such an implicit insanity acquittal.” Id. This statement about the defense
counsel’s “gamble” is the first in a series of implicit and unfair criticisms from
the state, and the court of appeals, directed towards defense counsel’s strategy at
trial. As discussed in Part I, supra, and as confirmed by the holding of Clifton, the
defense counsel had ample reasons to exclude evidence of mental illness at trial.
These reasons included: limiting incarceration (including the possibility of civil
commitment), providing the possibility of parole, protecting Ms. Clifton from
the stigma of mental illness, and limiting the release of invasive psychiatric
evaluations.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 700.
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A GBMI verdict violates due process and equal
protection when the defense did not place her mental
status at issue through an NGI or diminished capacity
defense,
The GBMI’s judicial determination violated Ms.
Clifton’s right to a jury trial post-Blakely v. Washington,
Post-trial determination of GBMI would violate the
proscription of double jeopardy.

After a hearing on GBMI, Judge Volland found, based on a
preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Clifton met the definition of
GBMI, but concluded the judicial determination of GBMI violated equal
protection when Ms. Clifton did not place her mental illness at issue.115
The superior court reasoned that to enter a verdict of GBMI in a posttrial procedure such as the pre-2012, section 12.47.050(d) of the Alaska
Statutes would violate Ms. Clifton’s constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process of law.116 In doing so, the superior court
reached two legal conclusions. First, section 12.47.50(d) of the Alaska
Statutes, by barring GBMI defendants from parole during treatment,
violated equal protection of the law because it infringed upon a
fundamental liberty interest in good time credits while similarly situated
sane people would be released under the same circumstances.117 Second,
post-Blakely, GBMI violated Ms. Clifton’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.118 The superior court determined that, because a GBMI verdict
functionally increased Ms. Clifton’s exposure to the maximum
punishment, she was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of GBMI and
that the government had to prove GBMI beyond a reasonable doubt.119
C.

State v. Clifton: The Court of Appeals Decision

The State appealed the sentencing court’s decision on GBMI.120 Ms.
Clifton argued that the court of appeals should uphold the decision on
the ground that in proving GBMI, the prosecution violated her right
against self-incrimination by presenting the results of her competency
evaluation.121 In its December 27, 2013 opinion, the Alaska Court of
Appeals discussed six legal issues: Blakely v. Washington, expert
witnesses, equal protection, due process, issues related to fair play, and
finally, double jeopardy. This Article will discuss these issues in the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. (summarizing the superior courts’ reasoning).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 698.
Id.
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order presented in the opinion.
1.

Blakely

The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with the superior court that
Blakely precludes the superior court from finding Ms. Clifton GBMI
without a jury determination.122
The court of appeals stated:
This good time credit, and the accompanying right to
mandatory parole, is not a discretionary aspect of Clifton’s
sentence. The superior court has no sentencing authority to
diminish Clifton’s good time credit, or to declare her ineligible
for parole. Rather, Clifton’s eligibility for mandatory parole can
be restricted only if she is found guilty but mentally ill.123
Relying on Forster and Blakely, the court of appeals found the pre2012 GBMI statute, in allowing the judge to be the fact finder under a
preponderance of the evidence standard, violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial.124 However, the statutory revisions in
2012 cured this deficiency, supra, Part II. Therefore, Judge Volland
correctly decided that the post-trial judicial determination was
unconstitutional under Blakely.
2.

Equal Protection

Ms. Clifton argued at trial and in her response brief that because
the GBMI verdict infringed on her fundamental liberty interest to be
released at the same time as other inmates convicted of the same crime,
and because the distinction is made on the basis of mental illness, the
GBMI verdict in Alaska cannot survive any level of equal protection
scrutiny.125 Ms. Clifton contended that section 12.47.050 of the Alaska
Statutes equated mental illness with dangerousness without making
dangerousness a separate showing at the trial court level, or at any level
of DoC review.126 As Ms. Clifton argued, equating mental illness with
dangerousness is antithetical to civil commitment in Alaska and
offensive to mental health professionals.127 Clifton further suggested that

122. Id. at 702.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Brief for Respondent at 34, State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App.
2013) (No. A-10941).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 36.
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this creates a problem of underinclusion in that Alaska’s GBMI statute
presupposes that all mentally ill persons are more dangerous than
mentally stable persons who commit the same crimes.128
In rejecting the dangerousness argument, the court of appeals
reasoned that “proof that a defendant suffered from a mental illness at
the time of the offense is not enough to support a verdict” of GBMI.129
Rather, to support a GBMI verdict, the State must prove both “that the
defendant [suffers] from a mental illness and that, because of this mental
illness, the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the
requirements of law.”130 Thus, according to the court of appeals, the
State must support both the mental illness and dangerousness of a
defendant.131 The court of appeals went on to reject the respondent’s
underinclusion argument, reasoning that the Alaska State Legislature
could reasonably conclude that the GBMI defendant “will be
significantly less receptive to parole supervision and control.”132 In this
section, the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of Alaska’s
GBMI statute on equal protection grounds.
3.

Due Process

The court continued on to address the respondent’s due process
concerns. Here, the court once again faced a problem of DoC review in a
GBMI case. In 1993’s Monroe v. State, the defendant argued that Alaska’s
GBMI statute does not provide an opportunity to review the necessity of
ongoing mental health treatment nor does it provide review of
defendant’s continuing mental illness while incarcerated.133 As
previously discussed in Parts I and II, supra, the DoC today has no
mechanism to review a defendant’s ongoing mental health diagnosis in
the GBMI context. In footnote four of Monroe, the court of appeals stated
that some type of review of the defendant’s ongoing need for mental
health treatment while the defendant could be eligible for good time

128. Id.
129. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 703.
130. Id. at 710 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(a)). The court went on to
briefly discuss the requirement of a procedural mechanism to “seek eligibility
for parole and furlough by demonstrating their lack of continued
dangerousness.” Id. at 704 (citing Monroe v. State, 847 P.2d 84, 90 n.4 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1993)). However, the court did not make a decision on this issue because
the issue was not yet ripe in Ms. Clifton’s situation. Id. at 704.
131. Id. (affirming Monroe, 847 P.2d at 90 n.4).
132. Id.
133. Monroe, 847 P.2d at 90 n.4.
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must be provided.134 However, the court recognized the issue was not
yet ripe for review.135 As Mr. Monroe was sentenced to sixty years’
incarceration, the issue in his case is unlikely to surface any time soon.136
In Clifton, the court of appeals reiterated the necessity for review at the
DoC level, but once again concluded the issue was not yet ripe for due
process review.137
4.

Fair Play

An overarching theme of Ms. Clifton’s argument on appeal and
likely obvious to anyone encountering Alaska’s GBMI scheme on first
blush, is that it is fundamentally unfair to subject a mentally ill person
who does not place their mental illness at issue during trial to a harsher
sentence than one who successfully hides their mental illness.138 Ms.
Clifton framed this issue on the basis of equal protection, but the court
of appeals separated the issue of fundamental fairness and framed it in
terms of the punishment imposed.139
The court of appeals separated Ms. Clifton’s argument into two
alleged consequences of a GBMI verdict to a defendant: first, she would
be forced to undergo mental health treatment while in DoC custody; and
second, she would be ineligible for parole or furlough while undergoing
this treatment.140 In rejecting Ms. Clifton’s first alleged consequence, the
court of appeals interpreted section 12.47.050(b) of the Alaska Statutes’
treatment provision as non-compulsory.141 Therefore, Ms. Clifton could
arguably refuse treatment by the DoC. However, the court noted: “this
would seemingly mean that defendants who did not spontaneously get
better would never be released on parole or furlough.”142
As to her second alleged consequence, the defendant argued that
giving “disparate treatment to defendants who have not placed their

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. (“Monroe would be ineligible for discretionary parole for an
extended period of time.”).
137. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 704–05.
138. Whether or not it is also fundamentally unfair to subject a mentally ill
person to a harsher punishment as a result of a crime committed while mentally
ill at all could be the subject of an entire article and will be left to a more capable
mind.
139. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 16–20. See also Clifton, 315
P.3d at 705–07 (discussing the unfairness of lack of parole and different
sentences).
140. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 699.
141. Id. at 705.
142. Id.
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mental illness at issue” was fundamentally unfair.143 She also argued
that a GBMI verdict was the “‘price’ that a defendant risks if the she
raises a defense based on mental disease or defect and is
unsuccessful.”144 However, the court of appeals pointed out that section
12.47.020(a) of the Alaska Statutes allows evidence of a defendant’s
mental disease or defect if such evidence is “relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a culpable mental state which is an
element of the crime.”145 The court reasoned:
AS 12.47.020(a) limits the admissibility of this evidence only in
the sense that if a defendant wishes to introduce evidence of
their mental disease or defect to negate a culpable mental state,
the defendant must give the State and the trial court advance
notice. Thus, under AS 12.47.020(a), the State can introduce
evidence of a defendant’s mental disease or defect if this
evidence is relevant to support the state’s allegations concerning
the defendant’s mental state.146
This discussion of the admissibility of evidence regarding the
defendant’s mental state leads us to the fifth argument of Clifton, the
advisability of using a mental health professional who evaluated a
mentally ill defendant for competency to testify as to the defendant’s
mental state at a GBMI trial.
5.

Expert Witnesses

There was an overarching disagreement whether Dr. Sperbeck
should have been allowed to testify at Ms. Clifton’s post-trial hearing for
GBMI.147 Dr. Sperbeck only evaluated Ms. Clifton for competency and
Ms. Clifton invoked her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to a judicial order to submit a mental health
evaluation to determine her mental state at the time of the crime. Dr.
Sperbeck evaluated Ms. Clifton for competency several times.148 At Ms.
Clifton’s hearing on GBMI, the prosecution called Dr. Sperbeck to testify
as to Ms. Clifton’s mental state at the time of the crime for the purpose

143. Id.
144. Id. at 706.
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis in original).
147. See id. at 701, 706 (concluding that the government’s use of Dr. Sperbeck
as a witness was not a constitutional violation). Compare Brief for Respondent,
supra note 125, at 16–20, with Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1–12 , State v. Clifton, 315
P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (No. A-10941).
148. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 699.
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of a GBMI determination.149 Ms. Clifton asked the court of appeals to
affirm the superior court’s decision on the grounds that including Dr.
Sperbeck’s testimony violated her right against self-incrimination.150 Dr.
Sperbeck stated that he could put aside his earlier examination of Ms.
Clifton and objectively assess Ms. Clifton.151 Judge Volland accepted Dr.
Sperbeck’s statement and allowed him to testify as an expert witness,
and the court of appeals allowed this assessment to stand.152
The court of appeals went on to say that evidence of a mental
illness was admissible for purposes of proving the defendant’s mental
state at the commission of the offense.153 This includes evidence of
mental illness for purposes of a GBMI determination.154 This is because
Blakely has placed the burden of proving all the elements of GBMI on the
prosecution when the defendant has not raised this issue at trial.155 The
elements of GBMI are distinct from the elements of the underlying
offense.156 Therefore, “the State can introduce evidence of a defendant’s
mental disease or defect if this evidence is relevant to support the state’s
allegations concerning the defendant’s mental state.”157
The court of appeals, in this portion of Clifton, allowed the
possibility that a previous competency evaluator could be able to ignore
several previous mental health evaluations and rely only on an objective
determination. This portion of the court’s decision will be discussed
further in Part IV(A) of this Article, infra.
6.

Bifurcation

In the event of a trial wherein neither the defense nor the
prosecution makes mental illness an issue, the prosecution can still seek
GBMI after a guilty verdict.158 Here, the “evidence of the defendant’s
mental disease or defect will be relevant only if the defendant is
convicted, because it is relevant to the type of disposition that the
sentencing court should impose on the defendant”—i.e., eligibility for
early release on parole.159
The result is a bifurcated trial wherein the issue of guilt or
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 701.
Id.
Id. at 701–02.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 701–02.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 706 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 707.
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innocence is adjudicated and a guilty verdict is entered, followed by
defense or prosecution’s motion to have the issue of GBMI litigated in
front of the same jury that decided guilt.160 If the prosecution raises the
issue, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury on GBMI and a finding
of GBMI beyond a reasonable doubt.161 This procedure, according to the
court of appeals, complies with Blakely, as discussed earlier, supra.
In the second, GBMI portion of the trial, the prosecution must
prove all elements of GBMI as separate and distinct from the underlying
charged offense.162
7.

Double Jeopardy

The court of appeals briefly concluded that subjecting Ms. Clifton
to a second trial to determine GBMI would not violate double jeopardy.
The court reasoned the elements of GBMI are separate and distinct from
the underlying offense.163 Also, Ms. Clifton’s counsel was insistent that
all evidence of mental illness must be excluded from her trial.164
8.

Final Points

The court was unclear, however, about whether the potential GBMI
defendant’s right to a jury trial under a “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard would apply if the defense raised the GBMI issue following a
guilty verdict. The court only stated: “Because . . . the defendant faces an
increased maximum sentence if the jury decides in the government’s
favor on this issue, the defendant is entitled to trial by jury and to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”165
Additionally, the court did not address the situation in which the
defense attempted an unsuccessful NGI defense and then the GBMI
verdict is presented as an alternative to the jury, as required by statute.
The court of appeals upheld the superior court’s determination that the
pre-2012 version of section 12.47.060 of the Alaska Statutes was
unconstitutional post-Blakely, but the court did not find the punishment
enhancement of GBMI unconstitutional as the superior court previously
determined.166

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 706; Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1170–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
Clifton, 315 P.3d at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 703–05.
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IV. MENTAL ILLNESS AS A TOOL OF THE PROSECUTION
But Talus sternely did upon them set,
And brusht and battred them without remorse,
That on the ground he left full many a corse;
Ne any able was him to withstand,
But he them overthrew both man and horse,
That they lay scattred over all the land,
As thicke as doth the seede after the sowers hand.
-Edmund Spencer, The Faerie Queen
Book V, Canto XII

The court of appeals decision in State v. Clifton further complicates
Alaska’s already strained relationship between mental illness and
criminal behavior. Now, a traditionally defense-oriented tool has been
crowned by the appellate court as a per se sentencing aggravator for
persons suffering from mental illness.
This Part addresses a potential broader use of guilty but mentally
ill (GBMI) in Alaska post-Clifton, and will examine two practical issues
the defense and prosecution will encounter during these proceedings,
one evidentiary and one ethical. This Part concludes with a discussion of
the Coordinated Resources Project (CRP or Mental Health Court) and
will show that the prosecution will gain no benefit from participating in
these elective programs post-Clifton.
A.

Evidentiary Issues: Competency Evaluations and Expert
Witnesses

Pre-Clifton, the use of competency evaluations in State criminal
proceedings existed in a nebulous and unclear state. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Estelle v. Smith167 stated that competency evaluations are
conducted for a limited, neutral purpose.168 In Alaska, use of
competency evaluations for evidence in an adversarial proceeding
violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.169 However,
R.H. v. State’s prohibition on competency evaluations in criminal
prosecutions is not as strong as one might view on first blush. In Monroe
v. State, the court of appeals found that it was not plain error for a trial
judge to allow a competency evaluator to testify as to GBMI if defense

167. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
168. Id. at 465.
169. R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
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counsel did not object in the proceeding for tactical reasons.170 This
means that a competency evaluator may also testify to a defendant’s
mental illness at the time of the offense, as long as they performed a
separate evaluation.
Pre-Clifton, there was at least an arguable position the defense
could take to exclude evidence of competency evaluations in a possible
GBMI situation. Now, the prosecution can not only present lay witness
testimony of the defendant’s mental illness, but the prosecution can also
bring in a former competency evaluator to testify about the defendant’s
mental state at the time of the offense as long as they say a few magic
words about objectivity and the defense does not object.171
If the prosecution can bring a competency evaluator in the second
half of a bifurcated GBMI trial to testify about the defendant’s mental
illness at the time of the commission of the crime, which can then be
used to aggravate and lengthen a defendant’s sentence, there is a huge
tactical risk in bringing forth competency concerns at the preliminary
stages of a client’s case. Seeking a competency evaluation would, in
practice, expose a client to a GBMI finding at a bifurcated GBMI trial,
and, consequently, to a longer prison term if the prosecution is
successful in establishing GBMI.
B.

Ethical Issues: Defense and Prosecution

Defense counsel has a duty to zealously advocate their client’s
position, which in the criminal context includes limiting their exposure
to incarceration.172 Attorneys also have a duty of confidentiality.173 The
duty of confidentiality can be overcome to a limited degree in the case of
a client with diminished capacity.174 If a lawyer reasonably believes their
client has diminished capacity as a result of mental illness and cannot
act reasonably to protect their own interests, the attorney may disclose
information to a tribunal which would indicate the defendant may not
be competent to stand trial and seek a competency evaluation.175 This

170. Monroe v. State, 847 P.2d 84, 87 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
171. The competency evaluator who testified in Ms. Clifton’s case is the same
person who testified in Mr. Monroe’s trial 20 years ago: David Sperbeck. Clifton,
315 P.3d at 699.
172. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009). This duty applies to all
lawyers, not just defense counsel. Id.
173. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
174. See ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2009) (when taking
protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized
under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests).
175. Id.
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decision is discretionary. The prosecution may then request a second
competency evaluation (it is this second competency evaluation from
which the prosecution can bring a competency evaluator as an expert
witness post-Clifton).
The A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards advise that the contents of a
competency evaluation “be considered privileged information and
should be used only in a proceeding to determine the defendant’s
competence.”176 The state’s use of the same competency evaluator as an
expert witness at a bifurcated GBMI trial does not comply with the
A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards. It is unreasonable to believe that a
competency evaluator who has seen a defendant several times, such as
the evaluator in Clifton, could set aside both their observations and
diagnosis and state to a jury completely objective opinions about the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense as an expert witness.
The State’s pursuit of GBMI also creates a Brady problem. The
government has special duties to disclose to the defense all evidence that
tends to negate guilt or mitigate an offense.177 In Brady v. Maryland,178 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that withholding exculpatory
evidence violates due process when the evidence is material to either
“guilt or . . . punishment.”179 As the Clifton court of appeals stated, mental
disease or defect in a GBMI determination will be relevant “to the type
of disposition that the sentencing court should impose on the
defendant,”180 any evidence of mental illness in order to mitigate a
culpable mental state must be disclosed to the defense before trial. This
places the government in an odd ontological position in the context of
prosecution–initiated GBMI. On one hand, the government must view
the evidence of mental illness as mitigating, material evidence that must
be disclosed to the defense because it has the ability to defeat the mens
rea element of the crime charged.181 On the other hand, the government
may pull an about-face and use this evidence in a bifurcated GBMI
proceeding to deny the defendant good-time parole.182 Therefore, in the
second half of a bifurcated GBMI trial, the prosecution must disclose all
evidence to the defense tending to negate a mental illness or risk
violating their duties under ARPC 3.8(d) and Brady. While in trial, the

176. A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Mental Health Standard 7-4.6.
177. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
178. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
179. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
180. State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694, 707 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (dicta).
181. A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Mental Health Standard 7-9. See
also, ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009) (demonstrating the
government’s duty to disclose evidence that mitigates guilt).
182. Clifton, 315 P.3d at 707.
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prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence tending to negate that very
fact.
This Brady problem reveals the prosecution’s unprincipled stance in
the bifurcated GBMI context, and on its face shows a lack of good faith
argument. In a situation where the defense presents evidence of mental
illness at trial, this problem is easily solved: the prosecution in this
scenario will almost invariably oppose the defense’s assertion of mental
illness throughout each prong of the bifurcated trial in an unsuccessful
NGI attempt, or throughout the trial in a defense-initiated GBMI trial.
The consistency of argument when mental illness is brought forth by the
defense does not implicate ethical issues regarding the special duties of
prosecutors. However, the prosecution’s switch in a bifurcated GBMI
trial shows that the conflicting use of evidence of mental illness by the
prosecution cannot align with their responsibility as ministers of justice.
Finally, it is likely post-Clifton that a prosecutor cannot try to
bifurcate a trial for GBMI unless she has probable cause to believe that
the defendant is mentally ill. A prosecutor cannot charge a crime unless
she believes the charge is supported by probable cause.183 As Blakely has
been applied to GBMI through Clifton and the 2012 statutory revisions,
the prosecution must prove all elements of GBMI beyond a reasonable
doubt, making the GBMI analogous to a sentencing aggravator.
Additionally, because the A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards advise
attorneys to refrain from using competency evaluations in any
proceeding other than a competency proceeding and Estelle
distinguishes the use of a competency evaluation for only limited,
neutral purposes, the prosecution should not use competency
evaluations to support the probable cause for GBMI, and must rely on
police reports, separate expert witnesses, and lay witness evidence
alone.
C.

CRP Courts

Post-Clifton, the prosecution will have little incentive to participate
in the Coordinated Resource Projects (CRP) currently in effect in Alaska
State District Courts. A CRP is a multi-dimensional, therapeutic court
that emphasizes treatment and stability as a cornerstone to solving
recidivism, desperation, and homelessness in Alaska’s mentally ill
community.184 Anchorage’s CRP functions as a diversionary program
designed to allow mentally ill misdemeanor defendants the opportunity
183. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009).
184. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TRANSFERABILITY
WELLNESS COURT MODEL (2008).
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to have their misdemeanor charges dismissed or significantly reduced in
exchange for following a court-ordered treatment plan.185
The CRP program involves a team of psychologists interviewing
the defendant, determining eligibility—i.e., that the person suffers from
a mental illness—and setting up a treatment plan which may include
medication, release to an assisted living facility, mandatory and frequent
drug testing, and therapy with an appropriate treatment provider.
Participation in the court usually takes a full year, and upon a successful
completion the participant gets their bargained-for lesser sentence, a
certificate of graduation, and a small gift. The defendant will come to
several “check in” type hearings throughout their time in CRP court to
ensure they remain compliant with the terms of a Rule 11 Agreement.186
The hearings are adversarial.
CRP court benefits the prosecution in that the defendant will
hopefully solve the underlying mental illness that contributes to their
criminal conduct, thus theoretically reducing recidivism. However, CRP
court requires a certain level of specialized knowledge that prosecution
typical prosecution does not present. A familiarity with the
community’s mental health treatment options, health insurance and
Medicaid, and a working knowledge of civil commitment and
competency evaluations is necessary to properly represent and
prosecute in CRP court. CRP court also requires a fair amount of
attorney time.
Prosecutorial use of GBMI risks the end of CRP court. Practically,
prosecutors will reject CRP court if they could get the same benefit
(mental health treatment) from a GBMI verdict. However, this is
problematic because DoC mental health treatment offered, whether
appropriate or not, would merely be a Band-Aid for larger collateral
consequences of the mental illness including homelessness—a widely
recognized problem in Alaska. CRP Courts work to provide a support
system while the mentally ill person is receiving treatment outside of
prison. To avoid CRP courts in favor of GBMI would deny the
community the benefit of seeing its neighbors properly housed, stable,
and able to receive much-needed mental health intervention.

185. Alaska Coordinated Resources Project: Alaska Mental Health Court, ALASKA
COURT
SYSTEM
2
(September
2006),
http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/
centerforhumandevelopment/fulllives/pastconferences/upload/judgerhoadesPub-100-Anchorage-Coordinated-Resources-Project-9-06.pdf.
186. A Rule 11 Agreement is a plea bargain in Alaska. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11.
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GBMI: Will Its Use Expand Post-Clifton?

The Clifton decision unequivocally allows the prosecution to
present mental illness as a potential aggravating factor into criminal
prosecutions through GBMI. This creates a risk that the State of Alaska
may try to extend more sentences, and open up the possibility of postincarceration civil commitment, for the mentally ill in non-traditionally
NGI or GBMI charges (rather than functionally limiting NGI/GBMI use
to high-exposure crimes like murder). For example, GBMI may infringe
on the State’s willingness to participate in the Coordinated Resources
Project Courts (CRP or Mental Health Court) for misdemeanors and
low-level felonies, supra. GBMI is a powerful tool for prosecutors to limit
parole and/or furlough to the mentally ill.
It seems very likely that after the court of appeals has given its
blessing to prosecution-initiated GBMI that its use will expand into
lower-level felonies and perhaps even misdemeanor crimes. The relative
ease of proving what is a lower standard than M’Naghten insanity in a
GBMI trial will encourage prosecutors to impose GBMI on defendants.
Prosecutors may think they are serving justice by helping the
mentally ill receive treatment in prison or jail. However, this could not
be further from the truth. In pursuing a GBMI verdict, they are actually
subjecting the mentally ill offender to longer prison sentences, branding
defendants with the stigma of mental illness, limiting their access to
mental health care of their own choosing, and possibly creating the
opportunity for abuse and maltreatment from other inmates. It is, as is
Artegall’s squire Talus (the “iron man”) from Spencer’s The Faerie
Queene, the allegorical equivalent to justice without mercy.

CONCLUSION
A year and a half after the Alaska Court of Appeal’s decision in
Clifton, Ms. Karan Clifton’s case continues in the superior court. Now
that the issue of guilt has been decided, it only remains to present the
GBMI determination to a jury. A trial on this matter is currently
scheduled for July 2015.
This article argues that both prosecution and defense counsel
should avoid the GBMI verdict. GBMI offends justice and when raised
by the State implicates ethical questions on the part of the prosecution.
We are measured by how we treat the most vulnerable members of
our community. Although Ms. Clifton does not lend herself to deep
sympathy, she is an extremely disabled woman. Because of her illness
she behaves in a way that necessitates her confinement from the public
and results in a significant loss of freedom. She did not choose to be a
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mentally ill person and yet her illness has confined her both
psychologically and physically.
This Article should not be read to minimize or excuse Ms. Clifton’s
actions. The victim in this case, and indeed all Alaskans, are entitled to
live their lives in safety. However, we should endeavor to punish people
only for their choices. Not, as in prosecution-initiated GBMI, for their
disabilities.

